STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY.
No. V. IDEALISM.
George Berkeley.
By the REV. JOHN BLACKET.
Bishop George Berkeley was a man of great natural ability and fine character. He came from a noble family, and was born in Kilkenny on March 12, 1685. Young Berkeley was educated first at Kilkenny, and in his fifteenth year entered Trinity College, Dublin. Here he resided first as student, then as fellow, for thirteen years. It was here that he came under the influence of Locke, and developed a system of philosophy the influence of which continues to this day.
Berkeley's intellect was of a high order. His system may be represented as universal immaterialism, in which the whole world of sense is spiritualized and idealized.
Idealism, of a kind, may be traced back to Zeno, of Elea, five hundred years before Christ, who argued that there was "only one thing really existing, all other things being only modifications, or appearances of that one." Zeno did not deny that there were many appearances; he denied that these appearances were real existences.
Idealism is the antithesis of realism.
The realist affirms that there is a world existing outside of us, and independently of us; he believes that if there were no one to perceive it, or to be conscious of it, it would, still exist.
The idealist says no; you are mistaken. The world is within us. It has no existence apart from the mind. It is a mental conception, and apart from that conception it cannot be. In recognizing what you assume to be an external world, all that is present to the mind is certain perceptions or ideas.
This is the position that Berkeley took up. Locke had laid down the principle that "the mind perceives nothing but its own ideas." This was the basis on which Berkeley built. He affirmed that what we call an external world is really an internal and ideal conception. Thus the universe becomes —not a creation existing outside of us— but a creation wrought within us. by God. I trust that the reader has grasped Berkeley's position; if so, he or she has succeeded where many a wise man and woman have failed. Perhaps no philosopher has been more misunderstood. Berkeley, had an acute intellect, and his theory is a very subtle one. It is difficult for us to enter into his personality, as it were, and to see from his mental standpoint. There were those in Berkeley's day who, as supposed refutation of his immaterialism, advised him to "run his head against a post," or "to walk over a precipice." These quite misunderstood him. Berkeley did not deny the reality of what comes under the notice of our senses—of what appears to us to be external. He took up the position that what we conceive to be outside of the mind is really within the mind ; that what we term external things are really internal ideas—they are impressions made upon our minds by God. Dr. Johnson kicked a stone, and in doing so thought that he had refuted Berkeley. The great man was quite mistaken. In kicking the stone, Berkeley would say that all that the kicker had before his mind was an idea—the idea of resistance, added to which, perhaps, was the idea of pain.
Berkeley laboured hard to show that we only had an ideal conception of the world and that an ideal, in the nature of things, must be internal, not external. Said he in his "Principles of Human Knowlege," anticipating in objection:—"But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books, existing in a closet; and nobody by to perceive them?" Surely, an external world would exist, though there were no one to perceive it? Berkeley's reply was: "You may imagine so;" but "what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them ? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This, therefore, is nothing to the purpose; it only shows that you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not show that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. . . . When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. A little attention will discover to anyone the truth, and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proof against the existence of material substance."
Again, let me ask: "Has the reader grasped the Berkeleyan position?" And, again, let me say, Berkeley did not deny the existence of certain things that represent themselves to us as hard, soft, hot, cold, black, white, round, or square. What he denied was that they had a real existence outside of us, independently of us. He affirmed that they were certain ideas that appealed to us and which were inwrought—not in the constitution of a supposed external world—but in the very constitution of the soul by the agency of God. To quote his own words again : "When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies we are all the while contemplating our own ideas."
We will carefully examine this statement, for it is the keystone of Berkeley's position. If he is right, then men have been under a misapprehension in all past ages. If the principle which he has laid down he true, then there is no external world, and from the dawn of human history men have been the dupes of their imaginations.
In cognizing what we consider to be external things, Berkeley says "all that the mind has before it are ideas." Now, ideas must be ideas of SOMETHING, and is not the something embodied in the idea? In order to form conceptions, not only must there be a conceiving mind, but "some basis on which the mind can operate. To talk of the mind forming ideas in the last analysis from nothing but ideas would be absurd.
Berkeley's fundamental principle, on which the whole of his system rests, that "the mind has nothing but ideas on which to operate," will not bear the weight which he has imposed upon it. At least, such is my conviction. An essential factor has been overlooked. The basis on which the mind operates has been passed by. If the mind has ideas, then it must have ideas of something.* What is that something? Is the data on which the mind operates outside of us, so to speak, or within us —only within us ? In other words— Is there an external world? Berkeley's reply is that it is within us.
Speaking of ideas (or, as he terms them in one place, objects of knowledge), he says: "It is not possible they should have any existence out of the minds of the thinking beings which perceive them." In another place he says: "It is indeed an opinion, strangely prevailing among men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects have an existence . . . distinct from their being perceived by the understanding, yet whosoever shall find in his heart to call it into question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction; for what are the forementioned objects but the things that we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our own ideas and sensations?"
This teaching amounts to a denial of an external world. It is subjective idealism. On this theory the world is really, wholly, and only within us.
"It is not possible," Berkeley says, "that ideas should exist out of the minds of the thinking beings which perceive them."
Now this statement is quite true. But it will not bear the vast superstructure that Berkeley has based upon it. Whilst the
The materialist said: "There is only one existence—matter. What you call mind is only a modification of matter."
Berkeley and his school said: "You are wrong. There is only one existence—mind. What you materialists call matter is really mind. It has no existence apart from mind. The universe is an ideal or spiritual something within us, not a real existence outside of us, and independent of us. When you materialists do your utmost to conceive an external world (material in its nature) you are all the time conceiving your own ideas. You speak of things as being hard, soft, hot, cold, rough, smooth, crooked, or straight. What are these but ideas? They are not existences outside of you, but sensations or ideas within you. If they were outside of you, you would not be conscious of them. In the nature of things they must be within you.
Here, then, are two phases of thought as far asunder as the poles. What position are we to take up in relation to them ? Shall we say, with the materialist, that there is only one existence—matter ? Or, with the idealist, that there is only one existence—mind ? We must not commit ourselves to one or the other, for both build on an assumption.
If Berkeley could have demonstrated his proposition that in the act of cognition "all that the mind has before it are ideas" he would have closed the door for ever to materialism. But this he could not do. As I have pointed out, ideas must be ideas of something. Though this ideas themselves must, in the nature of things, be ideal and internal, yet the things of which they are predicated may be material and external.
The fact of the matter appear to be that, in spite of Berkeley's idealism, there is an external world revealed to the soul through the medium of the senses; not existing apart from the mind, in the sense that Descartes taught, but in association with it. Here the idealist steps in and asks: "How associated with it? If matter and mind are distinct, what is the connecting link between the two? How does the objective become subjective?" I believe that the explanation lies in the compatibility between the two. Matter and mind are two distinct entities, yet there is an essential relationship between them. What we term matter is really a manifestation of mind. To me it is a kind of medium through which God, in a sense, makes Himself objective to man. The intelligent reader must not be alarmed. I am not a Pantheist. I do not say that the universe outside of us is God, but the medium through which God reveals Himself to man. Is not this the lesson that Paul taught when he said: "For the invisible things of Him, since the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even His everlasting power and divinity." The universe is really an appeal that a creative intelligence makes to a perceptive one, hence we can cognize it, form opinions respecting it, and learn the lessons that it teaches.
There are many other things that I would like to have said in this study, but space will not permit. Berkeley's idealism was to demonstrate the existence of God, the existence and immortality of the soul, and the certainty of all that comes within the range of our senses. As an evidence of the limitations of our nature, the very system that was to do this and much more laid the foundations for David Hume's destructive scepticism with which we shall deal in our next study.
* In after years, Kant, master metaphysician as he was, fell into a similar error. He affirmed that the mind did not know things in themselves, only representations. But representations must be representations of something.
Australian Christian Commonwealth (SA : 1901 - 1940), Friday 11 January 1907, page 3
No comments:
Post a Comment