PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY.

Sir,—I scarcely expected that my letter on this subject would have drawn forth such a strongly hostile utterance as that of Mr. David Blair's in your issue of yesterday. My object in writing was to express a hope that the newly-appointed lecturer on mental and moral philosophy at the Melbourne University would not, in his teaching, omit to expound the writings of the English school of philosophy, and confine himself chiefly to an exposition of what I venture to consider the uncongenial and unprofitable study of the German transcendental metaphysicians. With this object in view I thought it desirable to state, as briefly as possible, a few of the chief results obtained by the series of illustrious thinkers  who constitute the school of English philosophy. Mr. Blair's reply is little more than a strong denunciation of what he chooses to call "materialism" and "empirical philosophy" as contrasted with spiritualistic philosophy, especially as embodied in the writings of Kant. Now, to begin with, Mr Blair ought to know better than to class together all the English philosophers I named as "materialists." Bishop Berkeley was surely not one, and Mr. Spencer indignantly repudiates such an appellation. The question, as I conceive it, is not between "materialistic" and " spiritualistic" philosophy, but between a Philosophy that is intelligible to the average educated human mind, and one that is utterly unintelligible. It seems to me comparatively unimportant what views a teacher holds on the great questions of philosophical controversy, provided he expounds the arguments on both sides to his hearers. They will mostly be able to decide for themselves, and the truth will in the end generally prevail. But it is quite another thing to cram their minds with an unintelligible jargon that relates to nothing "in the heavens above or in the earth beneath," a course which can only result in producing a thorough distaste for everything in the nature of the higher speculation. Englishmen as a rule have always shown a healthy dislike to obscure and meaningless writers, and a preference for those that are clear and intelligible. Our philosophers have partaken strongly of this national characteristic, and consequently, whether their conclusions be accepted or rejected they can at any rate be understood. There are, however, and it is to be feared always will be, a certain class of minds to whom the obscure passes for the profound, to whom, like the old woman in the story, " that blessed word Mesopotamia" seems unspeakably comforting. Such persons will literally devote their time and energy in trying to discover "the secret of Hegel "— about as profitable a task as endeavouring to empty the ocean with a sieve. Was it not this distinguished philosopher who on one memorable occasion, after trying hard for many years to instil his subtle theories into the minds of the honest German youths who attended his class, made the mournful admission that "only one of his pupils had understood him, and he had misunderstood him ?" Is it not presumption, then, to expect that the colonial youth will ever be able to understand these unfathomable mysteries ? 

Mr. Blair contents himself with a point blank denial of my statement that the English school of philosophy is " rapidly dominating the intellectual life of Europe and America." One assertion may claim to be as good as another on a question which is necessarily almost impossible of proof. I am content to appeal to the judgment of anyone who is tolerably well acquainted with the current literature of foreign speculation. A distinguished French writer, M. Ribot, who has devoted a volume to expounding the doctrines of the modern English philosophers, after quoting John Stuart Mill's remark that "the sceptre of psychology has decidedly returned to England," says—" We might go further and maintain that it has never departed thence. No doubt psychological studies are now cultivated in England by first-class men, who by the solidity of their method, and—which is more rare—by the precision of their results, have caused the science to enter upon a new epoch ; but this is rather a redoubling than a renewal of its brilliancy." And M. Taine, in his history of English literature, devotes a long chapter to an account of John Stuart Mill's philosophy, which he regards as making an epoch in the history of human knowledge. If, as Mr. Blair says, " the English school of philosophy is falling into discredit," " has been weighed in the balance and found wanting," how is it that we find the discussion upon its principles and conclusions waxing hotter from day to day ? Judging from the tone of our periodical and general literature, I think it is safe to say that the theories of Herbert Spencer are exercising the minds of our age far more deeply than the speculations of Kant and Hegel. The doctrine of evolution, not the transcendental metaphysics, is the keynote of modern thought. But I am quite content to take the statement of Mr Blair and the Edinburgh reviewer, whom he quotes. Both assert that there is a revival of the "spiritualistic philosophy" just now, and that "Back to Kant" has become the watchword of a good many. Is not this in itself a rather damaging assertion? Is is not an admission that Kant has founded no school, has left no followers who have carried on his principles into fresh regions of thought ? It is not so with the English philosophy. No one would think of going back to Bacon for an exposition of the inductive logic. Mill's work contains a far clearer and more automatic exposition of the methods and principles of discovering and proving truth than could possibly have been propounded two or three centuries ago. No teacher would now content himself with the analytical psychology of Hobbes and Locke. The foundations which they so firmly laid have been built up into a lofty structure by a long succession of illustrious thinkers. The utilitarian theory of morals is more clearly and precisely stated by Austin than by his predecessors, Hobbes and Bentham. In other words, progressive improvement is the distinguishing mark of the English philosophical school. It has made great additions to our knowledge already, but it is capable in the future of making yet greater. But the German metaphysical writers have built up no structure, simply because their foundations have been laid in the sand. What that philosophy was a hundred years ago, when the Critique of Pure Reason was published, that is it to-day—an impenetrable jungle of meaningless words and phrases through which the human intellect is unable to discover any pathway. To use the brief but expressive language of the melancholy and meditative Hamlet, it is but " words, words, words " In proof of this, let any of your readers take up a volume of Kant or Hegel, and endeavour to read and understand it. They will scarcely think I have spoken too strongly.

As regards Mr Blair's other statements, there is not much to be said. It is hardly a sign of the declining influence of the "empirical philosophy," as Mr Blair calls it, that "it is repudiated with horror by the Roman Catholic Church," and "has no disciples amongst the clergy of the English Church," though I think the latter statement is by no means correct. The churches have never been in the vanguard of the seekers after truth. They have always followed at a very respectful distance, and have only accepted new truths when it was no longer possible to reject them. Yet in the English churches there is already a growing tendency on the part of the more enlightened and liberal of the clergy to come to terms with modern philosophy.

In conclusion, I will only add that I am far from sympathising with those who decry the teaching of philosophy as barren and futile. I believe there can be no better mental training than the study of the great speculative questions that have exercised the minds of some of the strongest and deepest thinkers the world has produced. Holding this opinion, it seems to me all the more important that the newly appointed lectureship at our University should not make a false start, and thereby cause a general distaste for those statues the promotion of which should be its only object

-Yours, &c, ANTI-METAPHYSICS.


The Argus 13 April 1883