BUCKLE'S HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN ENGLAND.*

REVIEW.

(From the Saturday Review. July 11.)

This very remarkable book reflects honour not only on the author, but on English literature. It is the first volume of a History of Civilization in England—perhaps the most interesting subject, if satisfactorily treated, that a student of philosophical history could have offered to him. We can only say that we think Mr. Buckle justified in undertaking it, and it needs but a few minutes' reflection to understand what is involved in competency for such a task. This is another of those great gatherings of knowledge in a proper framework, and with an adequate arrangement, which seem to be the especial fruits of English genius in the present day, and of which Mr. Grote's History of Greece, Mr. Merivale's History of Borne, and Dean Milman's History of Latin Christianity, are such conspicuous instances. We think we shall make our readers best understand the scope of this introductory volume, its relations to the whole work, and its claims on the serious attention of every one who wants to comprehend the real meaning of history, if we proceed at once to examine its contents, instead of offering any preliminary remarks on its merits. It lies so far out of the range of ordinary works on the subject, that criticism would be useless until the reader has made himself acquainted with the position which the author occupies.

Mr. Buckle begins by declaring it to be his object to treat history as the material from which we may generalize the laws of human action. He has, of course, to assume that human action is subjected to definite unvarying laws, and that these laws may in some appreciable manner be ascertained. This assumption trenches on the ground occupied by the conflicting dogmas of Free-will and Predestination—dogmas which, as the author parenthetically suggests, may have been impressed on the mind of man by the circumstances of his life in successive stages of society. His precarious tenure of subsistence while in a nomad state may have familiarized him with the notion of chance—of everything happening without previous plan—and so of free-will; and his observation of the regularity of the seasons, when he had passed into an agricultural state, may have brought home to him the notion of everything being determined and foreseen. Perhaps this suggestion is more ingenious than true; but, at any rate, its truth does not affect the main thread of the author's discussion. It is obvious that predestination has nothing really to do with the question of the regularity of human action; for it is not an account of anything which we trace in the phenomena before us, but a mere logical deduction from the attributes we hold to be involved in the idea of God. Free-will certainly is, or appears to be, a most important part of the action of individuals ; but if we look at society as a whole, we see that general influences and general movements of the mind swallow up and include the determinations of individual free-will. Probably no one doubts that this is, to some extent, the case; but most persons conceive that it is only the case within certain limits. Mr. Buckle, on the contrary, assumes that it is absolutely true, and that all human action is determined by uniform laws. He defends the assumption, partly by the consideration that human actions are the joint produce of the mind of man and of external nature and that we know the latter of the two factors to be governed by uniform laws, and partly by the testimony afforded by statistics, which show that while a community is in the same general state, the same crimes are repeated in the same numerical proportions. We will not inquire whether these statistics or any other considerations warrant the broad proposition that all human actions are regulated by uniform law, because it is not absolutely necessary for Mr. Buckle's purpose that this should be the case. We must all acknowledge that general causes operate on the condition and progress of human society. The question is, whether these causes can be ascertained, and the mode of their action analysed.

The difficulty, we need scarcely, say, lies in the complexity of the subject matter —in the vast number of causes which combine to produce human action and in the ceaseless reaction, of cause and effect. In order to penetrate this labyrinth, Mr. Buckle pursues a method on the adaptability of which to historical investigations the main value of his book depends. He makes the most general-division which the subject admits, and then selects one branch of that division as the more important. With this alone he occupies himself, rejecting altogether the less important. Of course, he admits that the subordinate cause will constantly modify the primary one; but in order to pursue the inquiry at all, he attends only to that which is modified—to that which, by the permanence of its presence, may be termed the substantial, as opposed to the accidental. The process is repeated until he arrives at that which he considers the most efficient cause, at once general and proximate, of human action in progressive societies. We say, " in progressive societies," for otherwise he would be writing the history; not of civilization, but of the world. If this method, which we may term that of the isolation of primary causes, is one that can be depended on, and if he have used it aright, it is obvious that Mr. Buckle's book has a scientific value—if the method or its employment is faulty, the book can only be a collection of hints or opinions about history, more or less valuable. We think that, on the whole, it deserves to be regarded in the former light, and that its leading principle is scientific and true.

As everything which conduces to form human action must proceed from within or from with out the mind, Mr. Buckle first inquires whether we are to look for the primary cause in the sphere of mental or of physical laws. He observes that, unless the natural conditions in which man is placed are such as to make nature subordinate to him, and induce him to undertake and prosecute the conquest of nature, the balance is inclined so powerfully against man, and nature so injures or overwhelms him, that he is incapable of a high civilization. The natural influences that chiefly operate on man may be divided under two heads. The first head includes climate, food, and soil—the second includes the general aspects of nature. If climate, food, and soil are very favourable to human life, if nature supplants the labour of man, the consequence is that a civilization is attained, early, rapid, but, after a short time, stationary; and the main reason why a continued advance is impossible, is, Mr. Buckle thinks, because under such circumstances wealth is sure to be unequally distributed. Population presses on subsistence, as food is obtained so easily as to stimulate to the utmost the increase of population. Oxidized food— the main requirement of the inhabitants of a hot country—is procurable from vegetables, and the copiousness of tropical vegetation provides a ready supply. And very little food suffices : for in a hot climate men require little to maintain animal heat, and are so inactive as to undergo little physical waste. Fertility of soil in hot climates accordingly tends to make population increase, and to place the labourer at the mercy of his employer. Satisfied with the minimum of subsistence, the poor man has no hope or wish to better himself ; and thus permanent castes are formed, and society gets fixed in a non-progressive type. Mr. Buckle traces the actual operation of these causes in the history of India, of Egypt, of Mexico, and Peru ; and this part of his volume is not only very learned, but very interesting.

That the general aspects of the external world in those parts of the globe where nature is most grand, threatening, and magnificent, act unfavourably on the mind of man by unduly stimulating the imagination, is a proposition too obvious and familiar to need proof. On the other hand; where nature is at once beautiful and serviceable, she not only quickens the poetical feelings, but strengthens, and educates the understanding. Mr. Buckle adduces, as a remarkable example of this contrast, the difference between India and Greece, and between the mythologies, the poetry, and the art of the two countries. We shall get into difficulties if we push the general truth too far, and attempt to trace the exact relation of every modification of climate with every variation of social character; but the general truth is indisputable, and Mr. Buckle is quite warranted in stating that there has always been something grotesque, trivial, and imperfect in every civilization except in that of the European nations, and that this imperfection is in a great measure attributable to the influence of the aspects of nature. We are now, therefore, in a position to answer the first question proposed to us. The primary cause of human action in progressive societies must be sought for in the influence of mental, not of physical laws—for nature is either subsidiary, or prevents progress altogether. And further, as the mind of man is continually subduing nature, when not subdued by it, it is evident that the conquest of nature is the first indispensable condition, and the great constituent element in the progress of man.

How are we to set to work to examine the mental laws on which we are now to fix our attention ? Not, says Mr. Buckle, by adopting the process of the metaphysician, who examines the constitution of his own mind. For, in the first place, the mind cannot separate itself as a thinking power from itself as an object ; and secondly, we find that all metaphysicians are divided on a question which they cannot possibly settle—whether man has ideas independently of experience. We must therefore, he says, look at mental laws, not as exhibited in a single mind, but as reflected in society at large. We shall then find an obvious distinction at the outset, which we may assume without inquiry or proof—the distinction between these laws according as they are moral or intellectual ; and our next inquiry will be whether the former or the latter are the more important. We must confess that we scarcely think Mr. Buckle justified in quarrelling with metaphysicians when he occupies such different ground. A writer who is content to begin with such a fact as the difference between moral and intellectual laws, must surely be aware that this fact is one that suggests a further analysis. It may be sufficient for Mr. Buckle's purpose to suppose that the difference is understood, but other inquirers may reasonably ask in what it really consists. If we pursue the inquiry, we shall soon come on the ground of the metaphysician, as will be the case if we start from the primary facts of any science whatever ; for the very aim of metaphysics is to supply, not the contents of any one science, but the groundwork of all. It would have seemed much more to the purpose if Mr. Buckle had pointed but why he determined to reject as his starting-point, not metaphysics, but psychology. It might have appeared that it would be proper to ascertain the operation of mental laws in the individual before examining their operation in masses of men ; and we cannot suppose Mr. Buckle to mean that psychology proceeds only by self analysis, for it employs the verification of the experience of other men. Of course he was quite right to reject psychology as a part of his task, for otherwise his labour would be superhuman. His subject is man in society, and he takes the salient facts of his subject which every one recognises, and begins with them. He could not do otherwise; but he steps out of his way to blame persons who fancy beginning a little higher up; and we must say that his language is not at all clear, nor his reasoning at all conclusive, in this part of his work.

That the primary cause for which we are in search is to be looked for in the sphere of intellectual, not of moral laws, Mr. Buckle asks us to admit on the following considerations :— 1. The great dogmas of morality do not change, whereas intellectual truths are progressive, and are therefore most likely to be the main source, of progress generally. 2. All great changes in European society can be immediately connected with intellectual movements. 3. Not only is intellect progressive, but its acquisitions are permanent, whereas the results of moral feeling are transitory; 4. If an ignorant man is good, he does more harm than an ignorant man who is bad, for he persists in his mistake with a conscientious ardour. We may observe that this proposition seems to us stated too broadly, and, though true in the instance taken by Mr. Buckle—that of religious persecution—it is open to great exception. 5. It is to the diffusion of knowledge, not to any alteration in moral feeling, that we owe the comparative cessation of the two greatest evils man inflicts on his fellows religious persecution and war. We think that Mr. Buckle makes good his point. The primary cause of progress is in the intellect; but the subordinate cause—that is, moral motives —modifies the primary cause indefinitely. We accept this conclusion, but we do not wish to overrate its importance. The modification produced by the moral and spiritual nature of man are so enormous, that unless they can be satisfactorily estimated, the apprehension of the primary cause of action can only lead to very limited and imperfect results. A step is made in science, but it is only a step.

We can how understand what is the fundamental position of the author. It is that the key to the history of civilization consists in the investigation of the successive movements of the human intellect, exhibited primarily in the conquest of man over nature. The history of civilization will record these movements and trace the actions resulting from them as modified by subordinate causes, of which the two principal are moral laws, and the effect of nature on man. To complete this history throughout would be far beyond the power of any single individual, and Mr. Buckle is, therefore, obliged to select the history of civilization in a particular country. He fixes on England, because intellectual movements have been less controlled here by pressure from constituted authorities than in France—are not confined to a few philosophers, as in Germany—and are not lowered to the standard of the multitude, as in the United States. But inasmuch as the very peculiarities which disqualify those nations are most important modifications of the general progress of mankind, and as they are visible, although in a minor degree, in English civilization, Mr. Buckle, before entering on his special subject, goes so far into the general History of Civilization as to examine these modifications in their most striking phase. Before entering on the History of Civilization in England, we are to have not only a conception of what is the primary cause of progress, but also an exemplification of the chief modifications to which it is subject—modifications which we shall hereafter meet with in the history of civilization in our own country, but which we shall thus have previously examined through a magnifying-glass. And this is the purport of the Introduction— in itself an undertaking of great magnitude. In the history of France we are to see the "protective spirit" (i.e., the pressure on intellectual movement exercised by the supreme authority of the State) exhibited in its political form. In the history of Spain we are to see the same spirit exhibited in its religious form. The laws of the diffusion of knowledge are to be exemplified by the history of America ; and the use of the deductive method, and the existence of a separate intellectual class, are to be illustrated by the history of Scotland, substituted for Germany as presenting more points of analogy with England. This first volume only carries us down to the end of the account of the protective spirit as exhibited in France. The remainder of the Introduction is yet to be published.

Before examining the history of the protective spirit, Mr. Buckle pauses to indicate that all intellectual movements have one point in common. They all spring from that habit of mind which he calls scepticism, but which—as scepticism is a word generally used in a deflected sense—we may periphrasize as the habit of not accepting any received truth except after an examination of evidence, and of refraining to make any assertion on either side farther than is warranted by inquiry. It is very evident that scepticism, as thus defined, is the fruit of a prior intellectual movement, and is a complex condition of the mind, capable of analysis, and presumably traceable to a remoter origin. The author does not, however, pursue any such preliminary investigation ; and at first sight, it appears superfluous to dwell at any length on the fruitfulness of scepticism. We do not seem to learn much when we are told that inquiry springs from the desire and habit of inquiry. But we conceive Mr. Buckle to have, in this part of his work, a double object. He wishes to show, first, that the great social changes of Europe are due to an intellectual movement—a position he assumes in an earlier part of the volume ; and, secondly, that the intellect, when operating as a source of social change, especially developes itself in that way in which it undertakes the conquest of nature—that is, by the methods of scientific investigation. With this view he runs rapidly over the history of England since the Reformation, noting the steps of progress, and pointing how inquiry has led to toleration in religion, and to liberty in politics. He then turns to France, and observes that in the sixteenth century a corresponding movement took place, represented by Montaigne and Descartes in literature, and by Henry IV. and Richelieu in politics, but that it was checked in the beginning of the reign of Louis XIV. by the influence of the protective spirit, to the history of which he therefore turns.

Mr. Buckle assigns to feudalism, and to the existence of a territorial aristocracy, by far the largest share in the nurture of this spirit in Europe; and he refers—though, as we think, far too exclusively—the whole difference between French and English history, and between the political habits of the two countries, to the fact that William the Conqueror made the English aristocracy so weak as to have to seek strength, by allying itself with the people. The main position, however, that the French aristocracy was by far the more powerful, and the more completely hardened into a caste, is indisputable. Mr. Buckle, alter showing how this acted in the Middle Ages, by depriving of vitality the municipal institutions of France—and how the league of the nobles to support the sympathetic protectiveness of the Catholic clergy failed in England, and succeeded in France—passes to the history of the revolutionary wars which broke out in both countries in the first half of the seventeenth century. The English Rebellion prospered, for it was a war of class against class, and the democratic or inferior class was strong enough in habits of self-reliance to make its numbers tell. But the Fronde was merely a division of the aristocratical body, and the side naturally prevailed which had the advantage of being countenanced by the Sovereign, the social and political head of the feudal hierarchy. A survey is then taken of the great and almost absolute triumph of the protective spirit under Louis XIV. A sketch follows of the early reaction against this, under the Regency of Louis XV.— when the French mind, being still too fettered to dream of attacking the Government, attacked the Church—and then of the later phase of this reaction, when, the Government was itself attacked, and the resistance to authority finally issued in the Revolution.

We have here hurried, in a few sentences, over matter which, in the volume before us, occupies nearly three hundred pages. We cannot do more in our columns than speak generally of such a work. But there are two portions of this history of the protective spirit in France, so new and so valuable, that we must specially direct the attention of our readers to them. The first is a most elaborate and learned discussion of the degree in which English literature and thought influenced France in the early part of the eighteenth century. Thy second is a review of the labours of the French in the field of physical science in the latter half of that century—the object of the author being, of course, to show that the intellectual movement which produced the French Revolution was especially allied in character and method to the mental operations of scientific inquiry.

This skeleton of the contents of Mr. Buckle's book will give our readers, we hope, some notion of its general purpose, but it can give none of the extraordinary richness and variety of the materials used. The main question is, whether Mr. Buckle's method is wrong or right—when we have determined that point, we are at liberty to admire the minor excellences of his work. Even a reader who should reject his method would find hints of the greatest value, and a great number of pithy and pregnant remarks. But we think the whole work greater than its parts. It is the scientific conception of history, the conviction of a universal order of the internal and external world, the co-ordination of the different branches of human knowledge, that constitute the chief merit of the book. The mere fact that such a subject has been undertaken will tell powerfully on the future labours, not only of English thinkers, but of the thinkers of all nations. Mr. Buckle has created a new standard of philosophical history, and we cannot praise his work either more highly or more justly than by saying that it as adequately embodies and represents the highest state of inquiry at this day, as the lectures of M. Guizot on Civilization represented that attained a quarter of a century ago. We do not assert that the one book is better than the other—we merely say that the general human intellect advances, and that the advance has found an expression in this work. We shall look for the succeeding volumes with the greatest interest. In conclusion, we ought, perhaps, to remark that Mr. Buckle lays himself open to criticisms on which persons who do not attempt seriously to appreciate his book will be apt to seize. He is apt to run off into disproportionate digressions—he is very dogmatic—he indulges in language needlessly bitter against persons and institutions ordinarily respected— he floods his pages with references not always very valuable or necessary—and he raises a smile at the outset by dedicating to his mother this "the first volume of his first work." We notice those slight defects and foibles, not because they really impair the merit of the work, but merely to avoid the appearance of concealment. In one way, perhaps, they may be serviceable. They will act as a test for readers ; for we may be sure that, when special attention is directed to them, it will be because the critic has no aptitude or taste for historical inquiry.

*History of Civilisation in England, By Henry Thomas Buckle. - Vol.1. London; John W. Parker and Son. 1857.

 Empire 15 September 1857,